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Abstract: 
The connection between liberalism and war has been a persistent recent focus in security 
studies. A large critical literature on liberal war has developed, ranging from viewing such 
wars as predicated on expanding spaces of capitalist accumulation to seeing them as 
techniques of a global liberal governmentality. However, this critical literature needs to be 
complemented by an institutional approach to militarism that links liberal war with broader 
societal dynamics of warfare. The article argues that the concept of ‘liberal militarism’ 
provides a means to better historicise and institutionalise liberal war beyond the sharp edge of 
military interventions, connecting liberal war to broader institutional manifestations of war 
preparations and war making, which are also fundamentally linked to liberal approaches to 
modernisation. The article uses the example of the United States during the Cold War and 
after to demonstrate that liberal approaches to modernisation were explicitly formulated as 
key to US foreign and security policy, a form of ‘military modernity’. The article further 
analyses US foreign policy in terms of the military modernity of ‘security assistance’ in the 
Obama Administration. Seeing liberal militarism through the lens of US-led modernisation 
efforts draws on important insights from the critical literature on liberalism and war, but 
emphasises the historical institutionalisation of military power as central to understanding its 
durability.  
Introduction 
The combination of liberalism and war has been a recurrent fascination for scholars and 
critics of US foreign policy. Post 9/11 US foreign policy, characterised not only by wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but also by a militarised counterterrorism policy, has only increased 
interest in the connections between liberalism and war. Discussions of the paradoxes of 
liberal wars became commonplace in the post-Cold War era (Dunne, 2009; Freedman, 2005; 
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c.f. Sørensen, 2006). While proponents of a Kantian ‘democratic peace’ believed that the 
spread of liberal democracies would lead to peace (at least amongst a community of 
democracies) (e.g. Brown et al., 1996), this was contrasted with an increasing bellicosity of 
relations with non-democracies (Desch, 2007/2008; Geis and Wagner, 2011; c.f. Jahn, 2005). 
These wars against illiberal spaces were seen by some as forms of humanitarian intervention 
premised on the universalism of liberal values, where war could be waged in the name of 
peace (e.g. Wheeler, 2000). However, critics have argued that war was being used as a means 
to impose particular sets of values and ‘peacefulness’ through state building (Chandler, 2002; 
c.f. Dodge, 2013). The practices of the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ were based on such 
liberal premises, beginning a decade of war and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, post-
war ‘stability operations’ and counterinsurgency, continuing today through various 
interventionary practices associated with military advisors, special operations and drone 
strikes (Gregory, 2011; Niva, 2013; Shaw, 2013).  
Much critical work in security studies has seen the liberal wars of the ‘War on Terror’ as 
an extension of US imperialism, a way of creating new spaces of neoliberal accumulation 
(Neocleous, 2014), or as part of a general extension of neoliberal governmentality and 
biopolitics (Dillon and Reid, 2009; Evans, 2010). While this work has brought many insights, 
it has lacked a longer historical perspective on the institutionalisation of liberal war, as well as 
an over-attention to the violent practices of war at the expense of its links to broader social 
structures.2 The article argues that a strengthened and historicised concept of militarism can 
help provide a deeper understanding of the links between liberal wars and the 
institutionalisation of military power within liberal states.  
Militarism has long been a focus for understanding the political character of states and 
their propensity to war (Berghahn, 1984; Vagts, 1959). Contemporary debates about US 
foreign policy have reinvigorated a critical analysis of the role of militarism in the 
international system (Bacevich, 2006; Goodman, 2013; Johnson, 2004). While it is clear that 
the concept itself is meant to refer to a proclivity to the use of force (and military power) in 
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foreign policy, these analyses have not always made the scope of US militarism clear. As 
Stavrianakis and Selby (2012) have noted, part of the issue is the real variety of ways in 
which militarism has been conceived of analytically, especially in terms of an overly narrow 
focus on particular dispositions and behaviours and a tendency towards over-generalisation 
about militarism itself. These issues in conceptualisation tended to gloss over the militarism 
of liberal states and differentiations between militarisms across states and societies. The 
present analysis draws on the final category discussed by Stavrianakis and Selby (2012), the 
sociological, which enables the conceptualisation of a militarism of liberal states that is 
different organizationally than others but has similar effects.  
 Liberalism and war can be fruitfully examined through the historical sociological 
literature on militarism, which more clearly situates militarism as a historical phenomenon 
and links its specific dynamics to the institutional characteristics of particular polities, 
societies and economies (Mann, 1987, 1988, 1996; Shaw, 1988, 2005, 2012; c.f. Berghahn, 
1984; Gillis, 1989). As Mann notes, militarism needs to be seen as ‘a set of attitudes and 
social practices which regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable 
social activity’ (1987: 35). In this fashion militarism is both a disposition that justifies 
particular security or military practices and a particular constellation of social forces 
surrounding the military and the institutionalisation of military power, that vary with time and 
place. The advantage of this approach is that it more concretely connects war as a social 
practice to the interplay of military institutions, political economy and social relations, seeing 
the contingent character of institutional development while not ignoring longer-term 
continuities. The article provides an account of ‘liberal’ militarism focused on longer-term 
historical processes embedded in a liberal political economy that can clarify issues of 
continuity and change (Edgerton, 1991, 2006; Joana and Mérand, 2014). Liberal militarism 
has historically focused on an expansive and crusading ideology, on technology and capital-
intensive warfare, and based on socio-economic interventions linked to liberal political 
economy (Edgerton, 1991).3 Crucially, all three dimensions are part of a modernising project 
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that aims to use war and military power to solve the ‘problem’ of illiberal (and ‘uncivilised’) 
states.  
The article makes the case in three steps. First, it goes into more detail concerning the 
concept of liberal militarism and its relationship to other critical perspectives on liberalism 
and war. Drawing on the historical sociological literature, it delineates liberal militarism in 
terms of ideology, capital-intensity and societal interventions, but argues that we need two 
additional features in order to better examine the institutionalisation of liberal militarism and 
its relationship to change: a focus on civil-military relations and the political-economic 
foundations of warfare. The second step applies this framework to the United States, arguing 
that liberal militarism is a military extension of modernisation efforts of the Cold War and 
beyond, as part of a means to liberalise societies: military power can be exercised both in 
terms of actual war-fighting as a modernising practice, but also through the adoption of US 
(and Western) ‘best practices’ and arms systems. Finally, it looks at United States foreign 
policy in the present, in terms of the militarised dynamics of ‘security assistance’ and arms 
transfers, arguing that these policies are part of a promotion of a particular of neoliberal 
militarism to other states and societies. Overall a focus ‘military modernisation’ as a part of 
liberal militarism rather than liberal war goes beyond the focus on the violent proclivities of 
liberalism to see military power as embedded in a broader political economy of war that also 
encompasses war preparations.  
War, Liberalism and Historical Change: From Liberal War to Liberal Militarism  
The paradoxes of liberal wars are well established. Michael Howard (1981) prominently 
argued that despite the importance that peace plays in liberal thought, liberal states are prone 
to the over-moralisation of war, which has been detrimental to peace in international relations. 
Core to liberal thought was not pacifism, but an interest in solving the problems of war 
through war itself. Two sets of critical literatures have picked up on this point with regard to 
                                                                                                                                                   
resonances with the concept developed here, they are broader and more historically attuned to pre-1945 state-
development. 
Caverley’s (2014) analysis of ‘democratic’ militarism has a similar focus on political economy – making an 
important argument concerning democratic publics’ support of wars that have deferred costs – but is less 
interested in the broader ideological ends that war serves. 
 5 
liberal warfare today. First is a broadly historical materialist critique of the use of military 
power as a means of imposing economic imperatives on other states and societies. Here war is 
seen as an extension of capitalist imperialism, particularly in its current neoliberal mode, and 
the focus is on opening up of new spaces of accumulation (Callinicos, 2003; Harvey, 2003) or 
‘pacifying’ uncivilised spaces (Neocleous, 2014). The second critique centres on the ‘liberal 
way of war’ that draws on Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics (e.g. 
Foucault, 2004, 2007, 2008). The ‘liberal way of war’ goes beyond mere violence or the 
institutions of the military, as liberal states not only engage in a crusade through militarised 
interventions abroad, but they also extend the power relations of liberal societies globally 
(Dillon and Reid, 2009; Evans, 2010; Jabri, 2006). The ‘liberal way of war’ is about using 
war as a technique of international biopower or governmentality, a means to pacifying and 
constituting the liberal subject (Dillon and Reid, 2009; Evans, 2010; Gregory, 2011; 
Kienscherf, 2011; Shaw, 2013). Both sets of arguments point to the contradiction at the heart 
of supposedly peaceful liberal logics of governance: that of using war as a means to make a 
‘liberal’ peace. 
Following from the historical sociological view given in the introduction, liberal war 
needs to be seen as a historically contingent set of practices – it cannot be generalised across 
time and place (c.f. Chandler, 2010). Furthermore, despite giving many insights, these two 
poles of the critical accounts neglect a crucial element for the understanding of liberal war: 
the broader institutions of warfare that reproduce and sustain it. While the Marxist accounts 
are right to focus on structures of domination and spaces of accumulation, they tend to see 
war as an extension of capitalism rather than a structural and institutional phenomenon of 
liberal societies in its own right (Balakrishnan, 2009); while the Foucaultian analysis of 
liberal war over-emphasises the biopolitics of liberal governmentality as expressed through 
warfare, and generalises and abstracts war as a technique of power (Chandler, 2009). Foucault 
in fact highlights the importance of the institutions of war, noting in his account of war as a 
historical discourse the beginnings of a political-economic analysis of society in early modern 
Europe:  
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it is war insofar as it is a way of waging war, a way of preparing for and 
organizing war. War in the sense of the distribution of weapons, the nature of 
weapons, fighting techniques, the recruitment and payment of soldiers, the 
taxes earmarked for the army; war as an internal institution, and not the raw 
event of a battle (2004: 159-160). 
What Foucault adds is the way in which military-political-economic organization precedes 
conquest, in that it is not the winning of battles that determines what the conquest will look 
like: ‘it is not because it takes the form of an invasion that war leaves its mark on the social 
body; it is because, through the intermediary of military institutions, it has general effects on 
the civil order as a whole’ (2004:159).4  If we add the organising feature of military 
institutions, broadly conceived, as a link between war and society, we can develop a broader 
analysis of war not just in terms of the practices of war itself (the battles, the immediate and 
potential looming violence), but also in the global structures that perpetuate and enable war. 
Thus we can draw from the critical accounts the ‘civilising’ and ‘pacifying’ elements of 
liberal warfare, but we must also note how these are embedded in the institutions of 
militarism within the state and projected globally.  
An analysis of militarism focuses on how military power is institutionalised and 
reproduced within and outside of liberal states. As noted in the introduction, militarism in 
general relates to war both in terms of a disposition towards seeing military power as useful 
for social goals as well as providing a legitimation for broader social practices that enable war 
(see Mann, 1987). ‘Liberal militarism’ can be seen as one type of militarism that developed in 
liberal polities, a means of institutionalising military power in a fashion that went along with 
liberal sensibilities embedded in a liberal political economy of war. Edgerton (1991: 141; c.f. 
2006) points to the development of four aspects of liberal militarism in the British context: an 
aversion to mass conscript armies; investment in technology and professionalism to make up 
for the lack of ‘manpower’; that militaries are not just directed at enemies abroad, but also at 
civilian populations and economic capacity (both ‘home’ and ‘abroad’); and ‘advances under 
the banner of its own universalist ideology and conception of a world order’. The broad 
                                                
4 See also his discussion of the ‘deployment of a permanent military apparatus’ in modern European states, 
which has further similarities in terms of the analysis here (Foucault, 2008: 305-306). Foucault was of course 
also critical of the analysis of institutions in their own right (despite some ambiguity on the subject), seeing the 
need for placing them in a broader context of order-making (see e.g. 2008: 116-120). 
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framework of liberal militarism – capital, intervention, ideology – gives us a sense of what is 
specific to liberal states’ approach to military power in the modern era.  
However, it leaves out two contingent factors. 5  First is the contingency of 
institutionalisation: the ways in which military power is institutionalised within liberal states. 
Institutionalisation involves both the positioning of the military and the normative invocation 
legitimating (and reproducing) particular configurations of civil-military relations. Huntington 
(1957; c.f. Lasswell, 1941) argued that there are two core dimensions of civil-military 
relations: the functional need for security, and the social and political imperatives arising 
from broad contours within society. These two axes proved crucial to debates in liberal states 
in terms of legitimating the role of the military in politics and public life and the size of forces 
that could be congruent with liberal life.6 The liberal attitude has tended towards advocating a 
strict separation of the military from civil affairs, especially from a political role. Essential to 
the liberal conception of civil-military relations is its relationship to professionalism, which is 
seen in Huntington’s (1957) model of objective civilian control: a professional core of 
officers deal with the majority of military policy, but directly follow the orders of their 
civilian masters. The important context to this argument was the future of liberalism in an age 
of greater global security threats, which liberal commentators framed in terms of a number of 
core problematics: liberal states could easily side-line the military in times of peace, but what 
would happen when security threats were more pressing and imminent? Would the switch see 
a decline of ‘objective control’ and a move towards a ‘garrison state’? (e.g. Lasswell, 1941). 
The second contingency relates to the political economy of war: how practices and 
preparations for war distinctly emerge from political-economic relations. As Shaw (1988) 
argues, war and militarism are separate from the logic of capitalism, but feed off the 
productive capacities of states, and, as such, war has to be seen as part of the totality of 
society. As he describes it, ‘we are talking about the role of socialised warfare in a militarised 
economy and society’ (Shaw, 1988: 24; c.f. Mann, 1993). Shaw brings warfare into a broader 
                                                
5 These link roughly to Shaw’s two determinants of militarism: the ‘social forces mobilised in military 
power’, how armed actors mobilise resources and constituencies; and ‘the social relations of military power’, the 
often conflictual relationship between armed actors and civilians (Shaw, 2012). 
6 For salient critiques of the divide between liberal civil society and military, see: Frazer and Hutchings, 
2011; and Neocleous, 2014: chap. 3. 
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structural logic of modern societies: it is not just parasitic on the mode of production, or 
instrumental in the expansion of capital. We might better see it as a link between modes of 
production and modes of destruction: shifting forms of political economy, in terms of both the 
organisation of markets and the dominant mode of production, help embed particular modes 
of destruction. In liberal states, there is an emphasis on capital-intensive forms of warfare 
(Edgerton, 2006), but one that is further tempered in relation to dominant ‘modes of warfare’ 
(Kaldor, 1982b).  
These two contingencies indicate that problems of militarism and militarisation are 
embedded in liberal states that are, contradictorily, ideologically critical of the institutions of 
war. While always defining itself against other, illiberal states, liberalism also has at its heart 
a modernising and civilising logic. If illiberal states were atavistic and war prone, liberal 
states would be beacons of civilization, and part of a process of modernisation (Berghahn, 
1984; Joas, 2003). The overall paradox of liberal modernisation was that it brought with it its 
own form of militarism, even as it was opposed to other ‘militarised’ states. As Shaw (2012) 
has pointed out, here lies the real essence of the problem of militarism: it has mainly been 
used as a pejorative term to demonize the enemy. However, ‘while the differences between 
ideologies which glorify war and those which don’t are significant, glorifying and non-
glorifying ideologies may equally justify war and military power, and in this sense have the 
same core social function’ (Shaw, 2012: 20). As such, liberal militarism is distinguished both 
in its particular arrangements for war preparations and how it legitimates the use of force, but 
is still a form of militarism. While we need to recognise potential differences within liberal 
states themselves in terms of the pursuit of militarism (Joana and Mérand, 2014), the US as a 
leading liberal state serves as an important example of the tendencies of liberal militarism and 
its links to modernisation. 
The United States and Liberal Military Modernity 
The development of the three aspects of liberal militarism – capital, intervention, ideology – 
in the United States have been the result of long term historical processes, giving a long 
continuity to the US statebuilding project, but one that has also been driven forward by 
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contingency. The early-Cold War period provided an institutional stability to the historical 
tendencies of liberal militarism, where it became clearly solidified as part of the US state, and 
eventually folded into a modernising logic, that became part of US ‘military modernity’.  
Political historian Richard Hofstadter once noted that ‘War has always been the Nemesis 
of the liberal tradition in America’ (Hofstadter, 1955: 272). This statement gets to the core of 
the problem of war and militarism in US history, and the important place it has had in US 
political life. While the view of the United States as a monolithic liberal society has been 
challenged for many years by analysts of American politics (Gerstle, 1994; Katznelson and 
Kalyvas, 2009; Smith, 1992; Wood, 2007), there is no doubt of liberalism’s importance in 
shaping the contours of politics, including military, security and foreign policy. The founders 
were critical of the idea of standing armies, peacetime conscription, and the concentration of 
military power that could be used as a form of tyranny (Friedberg, 2000; Krahmann, 2010). 
This was reflected in the lack of a substantial early military force – army or navy – with the 
US instead relying on militias and privateers to augment the small military forces that did 
exist. The dedication to liberalism created a problem in regards to how the US would 
reconcile liberalism with the instrumental use of military power. As Huntington noted, war 
was seen in moral terms, so required an extreme commitment: ‘Since liberalism deprecates 
the moral validity of the interests of state security, war must be either condemned as 
incompatible with liberal goals or justified as an ideological movement in support of those 
goals’ (1957: 151). 
The ideological focus of liberalism therefore fixated on the divide between the US 
actively pursuing its liberal beliefs internationally and passively setting an example. There has 
been much discussion of these two choices (e.g. Desch, 2007/2008; Green, 2012; McCartney, 
2004; Monten, 2005), but the link to modernisation provides a fruitful reference point. While 
modernisation is not usually clearly connected to militarism or militarisation, it was core to 
the liberal project (e.g. Latham, 2011; Westad, 2005), and connects to militarism through the 
exporting of liberal styles of military preparedness to other states. There were two core issues 
that the modernising logic raised with regard to militarism: how the US could institutionally 
deal with threatening militarised states and how to modernise other states.  
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The first concerned the relationship between the US and other powerful states which were 
illiberal: the issue here was whether military policies could be developed that would defy the 
challenge of strong states without liberal states succumbing to militarism themselves. By 
World War II, militarism had mainly become associated with the totalitarian states of the 
interwar period, and liberalism became an ideology based on the opposition to totalitarianism 
(Bell, 2014). Liberal democracies were opposed to militarised values, especially the 
combination of ‘collectivism’ and the domination of the state and politics by the military 
(Vagts, 1959; c.f. Friedberg, 2000). However, there was great concern that the need to combat 
and secure the liberal state against totalitarianism could lead to liberal states becoming 
militarised themselves, transforming into ‘garrison states’ predominated by military planners 
(Lasswell, 1941; c.f. Gleason, 1995: chap. 3); or, conversely, that liberal states would not be 
able to make the ideological compromises necessary to defend themselves (Huntington, 
1957). The focus on the scale and scope of the state and its potential for internal and external 
intervention became crucial for the institutionalisation of military power (i.e. in terms of civil-
military relations): achieving the appropriate balance between war preparation, military power 
and liberalism was necessary for the maintenance of security at home and from threatening 
states abroad. The shifting focus of liberalism to become, in essence, the opposite of 
totalitarianism brought clarity to both what was seen as threatening to the US and what the 
response would need to be. While the causes of the Cold War national security state have 
been endlessly debated (e.g. Friedberg, 2000; Hogan, 1998; Sherry, 1995), what is important 
is that it institutionalised the new dynamics of liberal militarism in the state. The national 
security state not only prioritised peacetime military mobilization in a way that was 
impossible previously, it embedded this in a series of organizational changes that pushed 
national security to the forefront of US political life: military professionalism was maintained, 
with increases in defence spending focusing on research and design and capital development 
via the private sector, but also requiring a larger ideological commitment to anti-communism 
(Hogan, 1998; Hooks and McLauchlan, 1992; Sherry, 1995; Waddell, 2001).  
The second issue concerned the potential to spread modernity more broadly, especially to 
less powerful states that were considered to be in need of ‘civilising’. In terms of external 
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modernisation and anti-militarism, it is clear that policymakers often folded modernisation 
into a broad sense of national security: that postcolonial states (and other allies) that followed 
the US path to development would both be better off, and also form a more peaceful part of 
the international system (Latham, 2011; Ekbladh, 2010; c.f. Duffield, 2005). Developing 
states would be modernised in order for them to avoid authoritarianism, and therefore become 
less militarised, and also ideological allies of the United States. However, liberal militarism 
was also integral to modernisation, as the US encouraged modernising states to develop 
military power in line with the US: focusing on capital-intensive militarisation with the US 
providing military aid through training and arms transfers (Kinsella, 2012: 110; Wendt and 
Barnett, 1993). Overall, a key part of US liberal militarism was not just a way of organising 
military power at home, but a ‘militarism of the globe’ (Mann, 1996) that attempted to embed 
military power across the international system in a fashion that reflected US liberal 
militarism, as well as through the deployment of US military presence throughout the world. 
As such, an early approach to the modernising process focused not just on the modernity 
inherent in industrialisation, but the values of liberal versions of civil-military relations (see 
Berghahn, 1984: chap. 4), especially in relation to the ‘Third World’. Furthermore, US liberal 
militarism was embedded globally through a broader political economy of militarism that 
used arms production and transfers, not only as political tools, but as ways of expanding and 
reproducing a particular global military order (Kaldor, 1982a; Stavrianakis, 2010). 
The interventionary aspect of modernisation and militarism became a crucial part of the 
Cold War, both domestically and internationally, effectively blurring the lines between these 
divisions. While the interventionary actions were seen both in military interventions 
themselves (covert and otherwise) and broader international economic policy, they were also 
fashioned in terms of ‘modernisation’. As NSC 52/3 noted:  
recognizing, however, that we do not have the resources unilaterally to defend, 
direct and support the entire non-Communist world, we are also assisting and 
encouraging those nations that are willing and able to contribute towards the 
same results we deem essential, to increase their political and economic 
stability and their military capabilities (National Security Council, 1949: 386-
387).  
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This description also links with ‘Point Four’ of President Truman’s Address to Congress on 
January 20, 1949 (Ekbladh, 2010: chap. 3; Latham, 2011). Point Four generated attention to 
the problems of external state development as part of the overall national security: if 
developing states could be brought along the modernising path of the United States, they 
would be more likely to be peaceful members of the international community. That a US 
ideology of modernisation co-existed with an increasingly popular Soviet model of 
modernisation – focused on rapid industrialisation – was also crucial (Westad, 2005). While 
more attention has been paid to Point Four as being influential for US developmental policy 
in the Cold War, it also went hand in hand with the broader goals of US liberal militarism as a 
modernising project. While early phases were mainly seen in terms of providing funding and 
incentives (and expertise) for post-colonial states to develop along the lines of the US, the 
relative failure of these early attempts (at least in terms of US policymakers getting their own 
desired outcomes) led to a more coercive focus to modernisation, especially in the Vietnam 
War (Ekbladh, 2010; Latham, 2011).  
The focus on modernisation in the Cold War was Keynesian in its outlook: it was part of 
creating a global ‘new deal’ that could foster sustained economic growth and the instantiation 
of strong market relations through a ‘top down’ approach focused on large-scale social 
engineering (Gilman, 2003; Latham, 2011). Where US policymakers failed was in the 
imposition of these features on states which were more committed to industrial independence: 
in India for example, there was much more of an interest in the Soviet model of 
modernisation that focused on rapid indigenous industrialisation as a way of ‘catching up’. In 
military terms, two versions dominated. The first was modernisation through military 
intervention, where intervention itself provided a means to modernise states and society. The 
second saw an intersection of strategic purpose and the spread of liberal ideas about military 
practice and organisation, through training and arms transfers. While modernisation theory in 
its top-down Keynesian version fell out of favour in the 1970s and 1980s as it was overtaken 
by the ‘Washington consensus’ of neoliberal development policy (Kiely, 2007), its broader 
ideological legacy remained, and carried on into the post-9/11 era of military intervention and 
state-building. The focus in statebuilding was much more predicated on the development of 
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‘good governance’ that would promote a flourishing economy (rather than large top-down 
programmes of the modernization in its heyday). Here we again see the promotion of military 
modernisation through direct military intervention (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) and through 
arms transfers and security assistance, but now focused on neoliberal ideas: now the state only 
minimally needs to set a context for bottom-up market-based programmes and allowing the 
private sector to flourish (Ekbladh, 2011). Neoliberal militarism therefore is still capital-
intensive, but more reliant on the private sector to innovate and provide logistical support 
(e.g. Erbel and Kinsey, 2016; Joana and Mérand, 2014; MacLeavy and Peoples, 2009); 
neoliberal military modernisation is the internationalisation of these ideas. 
Liberal Militarism and Modernisation Post-9/11 
While the United States struggled in the 1990s to find a coherent and broadly accepted 
rationale to support its national security state, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
reinvigorated the sense of purpose, refashioned against global terrorism (Jackson, 2011). 
President Bush captured the purpose in a Manichean worldview that mimicked the 
apocalyptic tones of the early Cold War (Bush, 2001; c.f. White House, 2002). However, 
what was core was a sense of the United States at the forefront of a moral, civilizational 
mission that necessitated a war on terror, as claimed by President Bush in his September 2001 
speech to Congress (Bush, 2001): the invocation of Nazism and totalitarianism in the speech 
also gave echoes of the earlier debates about liberalism and freedom. While the Bush 
Administration eventually dropped the rhetoric of a ‘war’ on terror – as seen in the more 
measured tone of the 2006 National Security Strategy (White House, 2006) – the ideology of 
security remained, one calling for US leadership against transnational terrorism, expressing an 
increased sense of risk in the world, with a need for US military intervention to stop it. The 
Obama Administration in the main dispensed with the divisive rhetoric of the war on terror 
(e.g. Obama, 2009b) while also scaling down the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, but 
retained much of the same counter-terrorism policy (Jackson, 2011; McCrisken, 2011). As 
such, this was not a move away from war, as demonstrated by President Obama’s Nobel 
Peace Prize speech (2009a) that emphasised the need for a ‘just war’ in certain circumstances, 
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seemingly backing up the counter-terrorism polices of his predecessor through a moralizing 
take on the use of military force. As such, the rhetoric of perpetual insecurity plays a crucial 
role in framing liberal war, especially in terms of the necessity of intervening in illiberal 
spaces as a means to fostering liberal identity and affirming US responsibility and 
exceptionalism.  
The emphasising of a civilizational narrative in US foreign policy brought a renewed 
focus on liberal modernisation. However, while the broad contours of liberal militarism were 
still present, the major shifts in geopolitics and the global political economy made the 
organizational imperatives of the shift towards a neoliberal dynamic (Harvey, 2005). The 
critical literature on liberal war is situated in this context, focusing on either the ways in 
which war was used to pacify new spaces of accumulation or as a technique of biopolitics and 
governmentality. However, we can additionally critically analyse the role of military 
interventions as part of reconstructing society in terms of what militaries themselves do. As 
Gilbert (2015: 203) has argued, ‘militaries are productive of markets, in times of war and 
peace, and gain influence through their commissioning and contracting’. Gilbert traces this 
idea through several core programmes the US military utilised in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
primarily the Commanders’ Emergency Response Programme (CERP) and the Task Force on 
Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO). The former enabled commanders to distribute 
money to small development-related projects with little oversight, and the latter forged links 
between US businesses and the private sector, as a means to rebuilding the economies of Iraq 
and Afghanistan through private enterprise.  
What is of great interest in terms of thinking about neoliberal militarism as a form of 
modernisation is the ways in which these programmes were clearly in line with implementing 
bottom-up policies aimed at neoliberal marketization. While they do not go as far as some 
commentators would have liked, they clearly do form a part of what Schramm positively 
described as ‘expeditionary economics’. As Schramm notes, ‘The United States’ armed forces 
are uniquely positioned to contribute to world peace and prosperity by means other than 
actual force’ (Schramm, 2010: 99). While Gilbert is more interested in how money becomes 
an actual ‘weapon’ of the US military (and despite the changing policy focus of the Obama 
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Administration, away from stability operations, the new doctrines remain fairly firmly 
embedded in military thinking), we can connect this more broadly to the interface between 
military power and economic power: not just in terms of how military interventions foster 
modernisation, but how exporting liberal models of military preparedness provide the 
background conditions for and institutionalisation of liberal militarism. As noted at the outset, 
liberal militarism here refers to a specifically liberal way of legitimating war and its 
preparations as socially useful, but fashioned in liberal terms. 
‘Security Assistance’ and Arms Transfers 
As a sector in which the US has a distinct advantage (economically and technologically), it is 
not surprising that there is a distinct confluence of interests in what is referred to as ‘Security 
Assistance’, which runs the gamut of activities to do with military training and arms transfers. 
Barkawi (2011) has referred to the military-to-military contacts as a form of ‘defence 
diplomacy’, a set of often asymmetrical relations that encourage US partners and allies to take 
up the burden of US security interests in various regions. The provision of training and 
transfer of arms is usually put in the context of geopolitics: that the US supplies arms to its 
allies and to states that it wants to form better relationships with. This was a common trope of 
the Cold War and is still the dominant frame for reading arms export policies. However, while 
this aspect is of course important, there is a broader set of processes involved, in relation to 
how arms transfers and production arrangements are part of a modernisation strategy. First 
and foremost, arms transfers are a means of modernising the militaries of states and especially 
developing states: in the context of US arms exports, this can be seen as part of liberal 
militarism in the sense that it focuses on military capacity in terms of capital-intensity that is 
also explicitly linked to US technology. While never a relationship of equality – in many 
cases North-South transfers created a form of dependency (Wendt and Barnett, 1993) – the 
transfer of US produced weapons is part of a broader political strategy of the US, and also 
often lines up with a broader liberal logic of what it means to have a modern military: that 
capital-intensity is crucial (Wendt and Barnett, 1993) and that civil-military relations should 
be shaped by ‘objective control’. This was clear in the Cold War, where weapons and training 
 16 
were often part of an effort to ensure allied states were not only playing on a the same field as 
the ‘enemies’ of the US, but that their militaries had a status that could effectively combat 
Soviet Communism. 
The post-Cold War era changed this picture somewhat. As direct geo-political threats to 
US interests receded, arms transfers were put in the context of business relationships rather 
than geopolitics. International arms sales increased during the Clinton Administration, at least 
partially for economic reasons: shoring up US defence industries that would be certain to see 
a decline in domestic sales (Wirls, 2013: 66-67). The new security challenge was maintaining 
a robust defence industrial base in an era of globalization (Wirls, 2013; c.f. MacLeavy and 
Peoples, 2009). While the increased concentration of defence firms in the US led to four main 
firms which had a narrow focus on defence-related products, there was a diversification of 
both supply chains and the use of off-the-shelf technologies from the civilian sector which 
could be used in defence manufacturing. The Cold War era ‘spin offs’ from the defence 
industry had been transformed into more integration, a process of ‘spinning in’ technologies 
from the civilian sector (Dunne and Surry, 2006). Post-9/11, while the security focus became 
more prominent, the commercial aspects of arms transfers were still pronounced, as can be 
seen in the volume of US arms transfers. In the Bush and Obama era, the US retained its 
leading role in the international arms industry, accounting for 30% of all sales in 2004-2008, 
and 29% in 2009-2013 (followed closest by Russia at 24% and 27% respectively) (Wezeman 
and Wezeman, 2014), with an 11% increase between the two periods. The US has retained an 
impressively diverse range of recipients, amounting to at least 90, and the top recipient, 
Australia, accounting for a 10% share (compared with Russia’s 52 recipients, with half going 
to China, India and Algeria) (Wezeman and Wezeman, 2014).  
As can be seen in the various statements from the Obama Administration concerning 
security assistance, it is not just important for achieving specific national security goals of the 
United States, but also in fostering partners to maintain a military edge over collective rivals, 
to encourage interoperability of equipment, and for persuading partner countries to develop 
indigenous capacities to defend themselves (US Department of Defense, 2014; White House, 
2013, 2014). But the core objective is for partner countries – whether in the North or South – 
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to be in line with US security goals. This can be seen clearly in US arms transfer policy: 
‘United States conventional arms transfer policy supports transfers that meet legitimate 
security requirements of our allies and partners in support of our national security and foreign 
policy interests’ (White House, 2014).   
While the focus on modernisation is not nearly as pronounced as it was in the Cold War, 
arms sales are still caught up in a modernising logic: while the core emphases in policy 
statements about arms transfers (and security assistance more generally) stress burden-sharing 
and common security goals, broader goals related to military modernisation are still apparent. 
For example, one of the goals stated as part of the Presidential Policy Directive 23, dealing 
with Security Sector Assistance, is to ‘promote universal values, such as good governance’ 
(White House, 2013), also expressed in a policy goal: ‘pursuit of security sector reform as 
part of a broader, long term effort to improve governance and promote sustainable economic 
development.’ Such commitments are also reflected in a later directive specifically dealing 
with arms transfer policy, where a core goal is ‘promoting the acquisition of U.S. systems to 
increase interoperability with allies and partners, lower the unit costs for all, and strengthen 
the industrial base’ (White House, 2014). These goals need to be seen in a broad fashion, in 
that security can be achieved by allies becoming more like the US, which can be actualised 
through the diffusion of neoliberal militarism.7 
The desire to maintain a modernising presence can be seen in US policy towards Asia-
Pacific. As part of its ‘pivot’ to Asia-Pacific, expressed in the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance (US Department of Defense, 2012), also occurring in a time of increasing austerity 
and increasing interdependence (with threats also transnationalised), the Obama 
Administration stressed the need to rely on regional allies, especially through training and 
modernisation programmes. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (US Department of 
Defense, 2014) emphasised this in its second ‘pillar’ of defence strategy, ‘building security 
globally’, which stressed the need to build up the capacity of partners, to ensure 
interoperability and the ability of partner states to work together to achieve common goals. 
                                                
7 A good example of this in the North can be found in the politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (for an 
overview, see Vucetic and Nossal, 2012-13; for a detailed case on the US and Norway, see Vucetic and Rydberg, 
2015). 
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While the usual alliances are emphasised in terms of Asia-Pacific (Australia, Japan, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand – and some new partnerships to build upon with 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore), one of the most interesting is the new approach towards 
India. As announced in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance document, the US was to take 
up a new strategic partnership with India as part of its focus on Asia-Pacific (US Department 
of Defense, 2012: 2). A crucial part of this growing cooperative arrangement has been a focus 
on arms industry relationships: in 2015, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi jointly 
announced a commitment to a new mechanism of cooperation (as part of a broader ‘statement 
of friendship’): the Defense Technology Trade Initiative (DTTI) (White House, 2015). The 
purpose of the DTTI is not only to form a stronger geostrategic partnership, but to also 
strengthen India’s defence industrial base and promote increasing business ties between 
defence industries. These efforts go beyond just an interest in security or economic 
prosperity; as Undersecretary for Defense Frank Kendall put it,  
our hope is that these efforts will begin a process of continued growth over 
time, until India and the U.S. achieve a strong and enduring partnership in 
military modernisation, technology, and manufacturing — because a strong 
Indian military serving as a security provider both regionally and throughout 
the globe is in the mutual interest of both our countries (Kendall, 2015). 
What is of great interest in terms of DTTI is the shift in US-Indian relations, and the 
diversification of the source of Indian arms. Long pursuing a foreign policy of nonalignment 
(and hampered by US trade sanctions), India had acquired the vast majority of its arms (and 
its developmental model) from the Soviet Union and then Russia. Despite some scepticism 
about the new arrangement (especially in terms of whether the US can overtake Russia as a 
main supplier of arms to India) (Raghuvanshi, 2015), the Modi government’s switch to 
improving their own defence industrial base is a crucial aspect, that chimes more broadly with 
US modernisation efforts. India currently imports 70% of its defence technology (mainly 
from Russia), and is currently the largest international importer of major arms (Shah, 2015; 
Wezeman and Wezeman, 2015). Under Modi, India is developing its defence industrial base 
through an indigenous production programme called ‘Make in India’, and here US support is 
really essential, especially through co-production projects, which will also eventually involve 
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technology transfer (Carter, 2013; Kendall, 2015; c.f. Lubold, 2015; Shah, 2015). As defence 
commentator Ashley Tellis put it: ‘I think there is a clear strategic judgement in India that 
important though Russia still is for India, Moscow represents the past, Washington represents 
the future’ (cited in: Raghuvanshi, 2015). As the relationship is still in its early stages, it is 
best to see it as a potential case of US-centric military modernisation, rather than a complete 
success.8  
Another key area of military modernisation through security assistance is to provide direct 
training and assistance to partner states. A number of programmes led by the Department of 
State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD) have been inaugurated to provide ‘capacity 
building’ as part of security assistance. While the DoS has traditionally taken the lead on such 
matters, an increasing amount of security assistance is being provided through the DoD, 
especially through the specialist Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (Pincus, 
2008). The DSCA is now in charge of running core programmes (though with the initial input 
of DoS) such as ‘Global Train and Equip’, ‘Foreign Military Sales’ (FMS), ‘Foreign Military 
Financing’ (FMF), and ‘International Military Education and Training’ (IMET). All of these 
programmes are designed in various ways to provide US equipment and training for ‘friendly 
states’ that build capacity and allow for interoperability. Training courses link to key goals 
such as ‘Military Professionalization’, ‘Interoperability with US & Coalition Forces’, 
‘Strategic Bilateral and Regional Relations’, ‘Institutional and Security Sector Reform’ and 
‘Border Security and Transnational Threats’ (US Departments of Defense and State, 2014). 
The importance of these programmes goes beyond the obvious benefits for the US – to the 
security environment, for interoperability and for the US defence industrial base – as these are 
often seen in tandem with a broader goal of security assistance, that capacity building leads to 
‘good governance’. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gregory M. Kausner (2013) put it, 
‘in Foreign Military Sales we often talk of a “total package approach” – but the package needs 
to be greater than a weapons system; it needs to involve, according to the situation, everything 
from institutional reform to legal reform to professional education’. There is a synergy 
between broad US foreign policy goals and shaping partner states to have modernised military 
                                                
8 On potential obstacles to US moves into the Indian defence market, see: Vucetic and Duarte (2015).  
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capabilities. The security cooperation fostered through such links goes beyond just alliances 
to broad modernisation strategies based on military capabilities: ‘capacity-building’ promotes 
capital-intensive warfare, liberal civil-military relations and the promotion of a marketised 
defence economy. As such, ‘security assistance’ concerns the spread of liberal militarism 
itself, promoting an ideology of neoliberalism around military preparation.   
Conclusion 
The study of liberalism and war is important. While much has been done in recent years to 
better understand the dynamics of liberal states fighting wars, more emphasis needs to be 
placed on understanding the societal dynamics of military power. Such dynamics are 
especially important in terms of the long-term historical institutionalisation of liberalism as a 
guiding ideology, and its broader, contingent effects on the organisation and practices of 
military power. While the critical literature on liberalism and war has come to provide an 
important reference point for understanding war today, it tends to overly focus on the 
structural aspects of liberal war, underplaying both the long term historical trajectories of 
liberalism in liberal societies and the specific institutionalisation of military power in relation 
to both liberalism and political economy. The article has argued that ‘liberal militarism’ is an 
important way of understanding the relationship between liberalism and military power, by 
embedding liberalism in the social and political institutions of military power in liberal states, 
especially examining the linkages between war, security and political economy. The case of 
the United States demonstrates the effectiveness of such analysis, by establishing that the link 
between liberalism and military practices has continuities shaped not only by the centrality of 
liberalism to US political life, but also to the particularities of the institutionalisation of liberal 
militarism in the early-Cold War period. Liberal militarism is one manifestation of militarism 
that developed in the early Cold War, highlighting liberalism’s tendency to turn wars into 
moral crusades, but also embedding preparations for war in the dynamics of liberal political 
economy (especially that of modernisation), leading to the prevalence of both capital-
intensive warfare and the predominance of the private sector in producing for war.  
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The United States, as both a leading liberal state and preeminent military power, was 
utilised as a core case of the usefulness of liberal militarism as a concept. Liberal militarism 
frames the institutionalisation of military power in the US, giving an overall direction to how 
militarism manifests in the US as a liberal state. However, as argued, the particularity of US 
liberal militarism is also related to its instantiation in a pattern of civil-military relations and 
in the dominant mode of warfare. The Cold War inaugurated a shift for the US, where 
permanent preparedness in an industrialised war economy was paramount, and the 
institutionalisation of militarism in the US state was modified to fit these new parameters. 
Civil-military relations were still shaped by professionalism, enhanced by an approach to 
capital-intensive warfare that was led by the state, but still in the hands of private industry. 
Overall, the ideology of US liberalism has been entwined with liberal modernisation, and this 
became a hallmark of US policy in the Cold War period, and became a part of liberal 
militarism in terms of promoting a military modernity to its allies and other post-colonial 
states as a means of both control and development. While this military modernisation did 
have a coercive edge (as seen in the Vietnam War) it also relied on other techniques, such as 
military training and arms transfers.  
In the post-Cold War period, the modernisation associated with US development 
programmes at their height – in the 1960s – had already been abandoned in favour of 
neoliberal development, which eschewed large top-down planning in favour of promoting 
‘good governance’ in the form of a reduced state role in the economy and increasing free 
trade and privatisation. While this was a direct rebuff to the liberal modernisers of the 1960s, 
it was still in the broadest sense an attempt at improvement through intervention – but a belief 
in the power of markets rather than in social engineering. This manifested itself in a change in 
military modernisation: while the US would intervene militarily to state-build these would be 
premised on promoting a new market society, rather than a strong state. The article argued 
that this could also be seen in the realm of security assistance, which included military 
training and arms transfer programmes. While partially about finding security through 
providing allies with adequate resources, security assistance also concerns setting up a 
‘modernised’ global military order, where like-minded states not only share US security 
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concerns, but also share them because their goals are the same. Further research needs to be 
done to analyse variation within modes of militarism, as the US is in many ways a special 
case due to its hegemonic position in the international system (see Joana and Mérand, 2014). 
However, a focus on liberal militarism rather than liberal war broadens out the critical 
analysis of present day military practices, by focusing on their long-term institutionalisation, 
while also further demonstrating that war is not just about battles and violent intervention, but 
about the instantiation of a political economy of war in the everyday structures of states and 
societies. 
References 
Bacevich AJ (2006) The New American Militarism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Balakrishnan G (2009) Antagonistics: Capitalism and Power in an Age of War. London: 
Verso. 
Barkawi T (2011) ‘Defence diplomacy’ in North-South relations. International Journal 66(3): 
597-612. 
Bell D (2014) What is liberalism? Political Theory 42(6): 682-715. 
Berghahn VR (1984) Militarism: The History of an International Debate. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Brown ME, Lynn-Jones SM and Miller SE (eds) (1996) Debating the Democratic Peace, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT.  
Bush GW (2001) Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people. 20 
September. Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643 
Callinicos A (2003) The New Mandarins of American Power. Cambridge: Polity. 
Carter AB (2013) Remarks by Deputy Secretary Carter on the U.S.-India defense partnership 
at the Center for American Progress. September 30, 2013. Available at: 
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5313 
Caverley, JD (2014) Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth and War. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Chandler D (2002) From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention. 
London: Pluto. 
Chandler D (2010) Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphyisics Journal of International 
Cooperation Studies 18(1): 85-94. 
Chandler D (2009) War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of ‘Global War’. Security 
Dialogue 40(3): 243-262. 
Desch MC (2007/2008) America's liberal illiberalism: The ideological origins of overreaction 
in U.S. foreign policy. International Security 32(3): 7-43. 
Dillon M and Reid J (2009) The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live. London: 
Routledge. 
Dodge T (2013) Intervention and dreams of exogenous statebuilding: The application of 
liberal peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq. Review of International Studies 39(5): 
1189-1212. 
 23 
Duffield M (2005) Getting savages to fight barbarians: Development, security and the 
colonial present. Conflict, Security and Development 5(2): 141-160. 
Dunne JP and Surry E (2006) Arms production. SIPRI Yearbook 2006. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dunne T (2009) Liberalism, international terrorism and democratic wars. International 
Relations 23(1): 107-114. 
Edgerton D (1991) Liberal militarism and the British state. New Left Review 185: 138-169. 
Edgerton D (2006) Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ekbladh D (2010) The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an 
American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Enloe C (2000) Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Erbel M and Kinsey C (2016), ‘Privatising Military Logistics’ in R Abrahamsen and A 
Leander (eds), Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies, London: Routledge. 
Evans B (2010) Foucault’s legacy: Security, war and violence in the 21st century. Security 
Dialogue 41(4): 413–433. 
Foucault M (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Foucault M (2007) Security, Territory, Population. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Foucault M (2004) Society must be Defended! Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Frazer E and Hutchings K (2011) Virtuous Violence and the Politics of Statecraft in 
Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Weber. Political Studies 59(1): 56-73. 
Freedman L (2005) The age of liberal wars. Review of International Studies 31 (Special 
Issue): 93-107. 
Friedberg AL (2000) In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Antistatism and its Cold 
War Grand Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Geis A and Wagner W (2011) How far is it from Königsberg to Kandahar? Democratic peace 
and democratic violence in international relations. Review of International Studies 37(4): 
1555-1577. 
Gerstle G (1994) The protean character of American liberalism. The American Historical 
Review 99(4): 1043-1073. 
Gilbert E (2015) Money as a ‘weapons system’ and the entrepreneurial way of war. Critical 
Military Studies 1(3): 202-219. 
Gilman N (2003) Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Gillis JR (ed) (1989) The Militarization of the Western World. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press. 
Gleason A (1995) Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Goodman MA (2013) National Insecurity: The Cost of American Militarism. San Francisco: 
City Lights Books. 
Green, BR (2012) Two concepts of liberty: U.S. cold war grand strategies and the liberal 
tradition. International Security 37(2): 9-43. 
Gregory D (2011) The everywhere war. The Geographical Journal 177(3): 238–250. 
Harvey D (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 24 
Harvey D (2003) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hofstadter R (1955) The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Vintage. 
Hogan MJ (1998) A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security 
State 1945-1954. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hooks G and McLauchlan G (1992) The institutional foundations of warmaking: Three eras 
of U.S. warmaking, 1939-1989. Theory and Society 21(6): 757-788. 
Howard M (1981) War and the Liberal Conscience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Huntington SP (1957) The Solider and State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military 
Relations. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.  
Jabri V (2006) War, security and the liberal state. Security Dialogue 37(1): 47–64. 
Jackson R (2011) Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of) change in US 
counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama. International Politics 48(2/3): 390-411. 
Jahn B (2005) Kant, Mill, and illiberal legacies in international affairs. International 
Organization 59(1): 177-207. 
Joana J and Mérand F (2014), ‘The Varieties of Liberal Militarism: A Typology’, French 
Politics 12(2): 177-191. 
Joas H (2003) War and Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
Johnson C (2004) The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic. 
New York: Verso. 
Kaldor M (1982a) The Baroque Arsenal. London: Andre Deutsch. 
Kaldor M (1982b) Warfare and Capitalism. In Exterminism and Cold War. London: Verso. 
Kalyvas A and Katznelson I (2008) Liberal Beginnings: Making a Republic for the Moderns. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kausner GM (2013) Opportunities and challenges in security cooperation: Remarks by the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency and 2013 Defense Security Cooperation Workshop, Hyatt Crystal 
City, Arlington, VA, April 24. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2013/207939.htm 
Kendall F (2015) More than just an idea. The Hindu, February 25. 
Kiely R (2007) The New Political Economy of Development: Globalization, Imperialism, 
Hegemony. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Kienscherf M (2011) A programme of global pacification: US counterinsurgency doctrine and 
the biopolitics of human (in)security. Security Dialogue 42(6): 517–535. 
Kinsella D (2012) The Global Arms Trade and the Diffusion of Militarism. In Stavrianakis A 
and Selby J (eds) Militarism and International Relations: Political Economy, Security, 
Theory. London: Routledge. 
Krahmann E (2010) States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lasswell H (1941) The garrison state. American Journal of Sociology 46(4): 455-468.  
Latham ME (2011) The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Lubold G (2015) U.S., India strengthen military ties with trade deals. Wall Street Journal, 
June 5. 
MacLeavy J and Peoples C (2009) Workfare-warfare: Neoliberalism, “active” welfare and the 
new American way of war. Antipode 41(5): 890-915. 
 25 
Mann M (1987) The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism. New Left Review Series 
I, 162 (March-April): 35-50. 
Mann M (1988) War and social theory: Into battle with classes, nations and states. In States, 
War and Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Mann M (1996) Authoritarian and liberal militarism: A contribution from comparative and 
historical sociology. In Smith S, Booth K and Zalewski M (eds), International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mann M (1993) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 
1760-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCartney PT (2004) American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to 
the Iraq War. Political Science Quarterly 119(3): 399-423. 
McCrisken T (2011) Ten years on: Obama’s war on terrorism in rhetoric and practice. 
International Affairs 87(4): 781-801. 
Monten J (2005) The roots of the Bush doctrine: Power, nationalism, and democracy 
promotion in U.S. strategy. International Security 29(4): 112-156. 
National Security Council (1949) NSC 52/3: Governmental programs in national security and 
international affairs for fiscal year 1951. In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: 
National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Washington: GPO. [1976] 
Neocleous M (2014) War Power, Police Power. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Niva S (2013) Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of 
networked warfare. Security Dialogue 44(3): 185-202. 
Obama B (2009a) A just and lasting peace: Nobel peace prize lecture. Oslo City Hall, 10 
December. Available at: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html 
Obama B (2009b) Remarks by the President on a new beginning. Cairo University, Cairo, 
Egypt, 4 June. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-cairo-university-6-04-09 
Pincus W (2008) Taking Defense’s hand out of State’s pocket. Washington Post, July 9.  
Raghuvanshi V (2015) India, US advance strategic Relations’, DefenseNews.com, January 28 
Available at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-
budget/industry/2015/01/28/india-obama-modi-dtti-us-agreement-weapons-coproduce-
bilateral-russia/22457599/ 
Schramm CJ (2010) Expeditionary economics: Spurring growth after conflicts and disasters. 
Foreign Affairs 89(3): 89-99 
Shah H (2015) In U.S.-India’s defense: Pivoting the strategic partnership forward. Foreign 
Policy, January 23 Available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/23/in-u-s-indias-
defense-pivoting-the-strategic-partnership-forward/ 
Shaw IGR (2013) Predator empire: The geopolitics of US drone warfare. Geopolitics 18(3): 
536-559. 
Shaw M (1988) Dialectics of War. London: Pluto. 
Shaw M (2005) The New Western War of War. Cambridge: Polity. 
Shaw M (2012) Twentieth century militarism: A historical-sociological framework. In 
Stavrianakis A and Selby J (eds), Militarism and International Relations: Political 
Economy, Security, Theory. London: Routledge. 
Sherry MS (1995) In the Shadow of War: America since the 1930s. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 26 
Smith RM (1993) Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The multiple traditions in 
America. The American Political Science Review 87(3): 549-566. 
Sørensen G (2006) Liberalism of restraint and liberalism of imposition: Liberal values and 
world order in the new millennium. International Relations 20(3): 251-272. 
Stavrianakis A (2010) Taking Aim at the Arms Trade: NGOS, Global Civil Society and the 
World Military Order. London: Zed Books. 
Stavrianakis A and Selby J (2012) Militarism and international relations in the twenty-first 
century. In Stavrianakis A and Selby J (eds), Militarism and International Relations: 
Political Economy, Security, Theory. London: Routledge. 
Sylvester C (2012) War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory. Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 40(3): 483-503. 
US Department of Defense (2014) Quadrennial defense review 2014. Washington: GPO. 
US Department of Defense (2012) Sustaining global leadership: Priorities for 21st century 
defense. Washington, DC: GPO.  
US Departments of Defense and State (2014) Joint report to Congress: Foreign military 
training, fiscal years 2014 and 2015, vol. 1. Washington: GPO. 
Vagts A (1959) A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military, rev. ed. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Vucetic S and Duarte E (2015) New fighter aircraft acquisitions in Brazil and India: Why not 
buy American? Politics and Policy 43(3): 201-425. 
Vucetic S and Nossal KR (2012-13) The international politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
International Journal 68(1): 3-12. 
Vucetic S and Rydberg R (2015), Remnants of empire: Tracing Norway's F-35 decision. 
Contemporary Security Policy 36(1): 56-78. 
Waddell B (2001) The War Against the New Deal: World War II and American Democracy. 
DeKalb: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Wendt A and M Barnett (1993) Dependent state formation and Third World militarization. 
Review of International Studies 19(4): 321-347. 
Westad OA (2005) The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wezeman PD and ST Wezeman (2014) Trends in international arms transfers, 2013. SIPRI 
Fact Sheet. March. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
Wezeman PD and ST Wezeman (2015) Trends in international arms transfers, 2014. SIPRI 
Fact Sheet. March. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
Wheeler NJ (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
White House (2013) Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy. April 5. Available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-
assistance-policy 
White House (2002) The national security strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington, DC: GPO. 
White House (2006) The national security strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington, DC: GPO. 
White House (2014) Presidential policy directive -- United States conventional arms transfer 
policy. January 15. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/15/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-conventional-arms-transfer-p 
 27 
White House (2015) U.S.-India joint statement: ‘Shared effort; progress for all’. January 25. 
Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-
statement-shared-effort-progress-all 
Whitworth S (2007) Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner. 
Wirls D (2010) Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Wood J (2007) Anglo-American liberal militarism and the idea of the citizen soldier. 
International Journal 62(2): 403-422. 
